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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ARGUMENT
Appellant replies to th2 arguments raised by Respondent in its
Brief (hereafter, "Brief") as follows:
1.

Respondent has argued:
The Uniform Act on Paternity does not create a new
cause of action that did not exist previously, it
merely establishes a procedural mechanism for the enforcement of a child's long recognized right of care
and support from its father . .
(Brief, p. 2.)

The inference is that no substantive state law has been broken by
Appellant-defendant; and, therefore, Appellant may not seek jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to Section 78-3a-16(1) of
the Juvenile Court Act.
Appellant replies:

On the contrary, the Utah Uniform Act on

Paternity specifically creates a cause of action.

It is under this

act that the State of Utah [Respondent] has been able to become a
party to this paternity action (Section 78-45a-2, U.C.A.

(1953)).

Moreover, the Uniform Act on Paternity specifically establishes
the father's responsibility for the costs of the mother's pregnancy and confinement (Ibid., Section 78-45a-l; Complaint, paragraph 6); for the costs of the child's education and funeral
78-45a-l, U.C.A.

(1953)); and, arguably, for certain or

all costs incurred in bringing an action such as the present one
(Ibid., Section 78-45a-9; Complaint, Prayer, paragraph 7).
the state law in question is more than procedural:
tive.

Thus,

it is substan-

And its violation properly triggers the juvenile court's

jurisdiction under Section 78-3a-1G (1), U.C.A.
-1-

(1953).

2.

Respondent has argued:

''Appel l.-J.nl has not bt'r'n

charged with viola ting any la1·J or ordin<:rnce. " (Brief, µ. 4.)
Appellant replies:

Respondent's semantics are unconvinciny.

For example, paragraphs G and 7 of the Complaint

a

number of Appellant's asserted "failures" to have complied
with the requirements of Section 78-45a-l of the Uniform Act
on Paternity.

Thus, Appellant has been charged with the vio-

lation of a substantive state law.
3.

Respondent has argued:

The present litigation con-

cerns, not the violation of a law or ordinance, but "simply
the enforcement of Appellant's moral obligation to support his
child."

(Brief, p. 4.)

Appellant replies:

Moral obligations are not enforceable

in a court of law; laws are enforceable in a court of law.
here, two laws con£lict with each other.

But

Against that context,

perhaps, it may be appropriate for a court to consider the
moral obligations from which, ultimately, those two laws derive.
The Uniform Act on Paternity derives from the parents' obligation to nurture their offspring.

The Juvenile Court Act derives

from an equally basic moral imperative.

It derives from the

obligation of humankind to socialize its successor generations-to salvage its young, not only from neglect and abuse, but to
salvage its young from the inevitable errors and deficiencies
of youth itself.

In his appeal, Appellant does not shy away

from the issue raised by Respondent.

Rather, he urges the

Court to ponder the moral underpinnings of the two conflicting

-2-

laws--and to conclude that the higher moral obligation is to try
to salvage a boy and that the lower moral obligation is to visit
on a man protracted punishment (called "responsibility")

for the

senseless act of a child.
4.

Alternatively, Respondent has argued that Section 78-3a-

16(1) of the Juvenile Court Act establishes jurisdiction in the
juvenile courts where only a criminal law has been violated.
Respondent has supported its position with three observations.
(a) First, Respondent has cited Section 78-3a-39 of the Juvenile
Court Act, whose "list of possible dispositions of a case within
the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court" presumably shows a statutory intent that the juvenile court deal with violations of only
criminal laws and ordinances.
Appellant replies:

(Brief, p. 3.)

In its Brief, Respondent cited five sub-

paragraphs of Section 78-Ja-39.

But other subparagraphs of the

same section show that the juvenile court possesses wide latitude
to guide children who have encountered all sorts of difficulties-including that particular difficulty confronting Appelant today:
(10)
The court may order that the child be examined
or treated by a physician, surgeon, psychiatrist, or
psychologist, or that he receive other special care
(13)
In support of a decree under section 78-Ja-16
the court may make an order setting forth reasonable
conditions to be complied with . . . including .
restrictions on the child's associates, occupation,
and other activities, and requirements to be observed by the parents or custodian.
(17)
The court may make any other reasonable orders
which are for the best interest of the child or
are required for the protection of the public.
-3-

(b)

Secondly, Respondent has

Appellant's rEfer-

ences to other states whose statutes, like Utah's, assign broad
jurisdiction to the juvenile courts.

Respondent has asserted

that all such statutes assign jurisdiction where only a criminal
law has been violated.
Appellant replies:

(Brief, p. 4.)
Admittedly, certain states, by statute,

limit the jurisdiction of their juvenile courts to violations of
only criminal laws.

But there are other states--including Utah--

whose statutes extend that jurisdiction to instances where any
state law has been broken.

These two basically contrasting sets

of statutes exist among the states.

It is reasonable, therefore,

where any one of these statutes is to be interpreted, that it be
interpreted to mean precisely what it says--and not to mean what
the opposite set says.

This is all the more true because Utah

has foregone an eighteen-year opportunity (since the passage of
its Juvenile Court Act in 1965) to amend its statute to restrict
the jurisdiction of its juvenile courts.
(c)

Thirdly, to test the aptness of Appellant's broad read-

ing of Section 78-3a-16(1)

(i.e., that it refers to violations

of all laws, civil as well as criminal), Respondent would apply
Appellant's [mis]interpretation to circumstances where a child
has breached other non-criminal statutes, such as unlawful
detainer, wrongful death, or products liability.

(Brief, p. 5.)

As argued by Respondent, Appellant fails the test.
Appellant replies:

Essentially, Appellant's reading of

-4-

the ,;tatutc creates no problems.

But wherever his interpretation

may lead to an absurdity, his interpretation should not be followed
in that particular application.

(The single instance among the

cited examples would be the wrongful death statute.)

On the

other hand, where his interpretation of the statute does not lead
to an absurdity, it should be followed; because his interpretation
is closest to the literal meaning of the statute and closest,
also, to the spirit of the statute.
(d) Fourthly, Respondent has cited State v. Dung Jo, 585 P.2d
464 (Utah, 1978), to support its contention that violations of
only a criminal law may trigger juvenile court jurisdiction.
Appellant replies:

In Dung Jo this Court held that, at the

relevant time, there existed no Utah law prohibiting a child from
running away from home.

Thus, as Respondent itself has admitted,

"the actions of the minor child were violations of no law .
and jurisdiction of the juvenile court was properly denied.
p. 5.)

(Brief,

In the case at bar, however, Appellant's asserted siring

of a child whom he has failed to support clearly does violate the
Utah Uniform Act on Paternity.

Therefore--and consistently--,

jurisdiction should now be exercised by the juvenile court.
5.

Lastly, Respondent has argued:

In setting a parent's

support obligation dollar-amounts, the district court, pursuant
to Section 78-45-7 (2), U.C.A.
factors."

(Brief, p. 6.)

(1953), "must consider all relevant

The inference is that a juvenile court

can exercise no more flexibility than the district court; and,
therefore, the instant appeal for transfer to the juvenile court
-5-

is futile.
Appellant replies:

The relevant factors set forth in Soct 100

78-45-7(2) and intended to guide the district court in a case
such as this are all, save one, framed in financial terms. 1

In

any event, the relevant factors of Section 78-45-7 do not envision
the age, immaturity or emotional problems of the parent at the
time the parent engendered the offspring.

Nor do they embrace

the likely psychological and social repercussions upon a childparent when faced with prospective liability continuing for
eighteen years [minimum].

On the other hand, the juvenile court

is free to consider these very factors.

Unlike the district

court, the juvenile court is mandated by law to devise a resolution, not only that will serve the best interests of the

1.
Factor (f) refers to the "age of the parties." In context the reference appears to be to the age of the obligee or
child.
In further rebuttal to Respondent's citing of Section 78-457, Appellant respectfully refers the Court to Subsection 78-457(3), which requires the district court to "determine and
assess all arrear ages based upon, but not limited to:
(a)
the amount of public assistance received by the obligee, if
any; (b) the funds that have been reasonably and necessarily
expended in support of spouse and children."
Appellant asks:
Does this not mean that, while Appellant
remains an unemancipated child and/or student supported by his
family, the mother of the offspring will continue to draw
public assistance as she already has done (Complaint,
2, 9, 10, 11); and, finally, when Appellant does become selfsupporting, the court must back-assess him for all previous
welfare expenditures, in addition to requiring him to muke
ongoing support payments? Is this the sort of equituble, humane
and relevant judicial determination that the respondent State_
of Utah would hold out to the Court in defense of its position'
-6-

state, but that will serve the welfare of this child-Appellant,
as w211.

2
CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, Appellant urges this Court to reverse
the district court's Order and to transfer jurisdiction in the
instant matter to the appropriate juvenile court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this ;:!,1_ day of June, 1983.

JO N E. HRVEY
Attorney for DefbndantAppellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I caused to be delivered two copies of the
above pleading to Sandy Mooy, Esq., Attorney for PlaintiffRespondent, c/o Salt Lake County Attorney, 231 East 4th South,
Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this '23

day of June,

1983.

2. Paraphrasing in part Section 78-3a-l, U.C.A. (1953), which
section sets forth the purposes of the Juvenile Court Act.
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